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3ABSTRACT
This paper examines the quality of financial statements reported by private equity (PE)
backed companies in the years around the initial PE investment. We study both pre- and post-
investment earnings characteristics of a unique hand-collected sample of 556 Belgian unlisted
companies, receiving PE financing between 1985 & 1999, and a matched non-PE backed
sample. We find strong evidence of upward earnings management in the PE backed sample
prior to the investment year, consistent with the hypothesis that entrepreneurs which apply for
PE manage earnings upward to catch PE investors’ interest. Further, PE backed companies
show a significantly higher extent of earnings conservatism compared to matched companies
from the investment year on, indicating a governance impact of PE investors on the financial
reporting discipline. Finally, we find a marginally higher degree of earnings conservatism for
companies receiving PE from non-government related investors compared to companies
backed by government-related PE investors. We interpret this stricter financial reporting
discipline as being the reflection of a more slack governance by government-related PE
investors compared to non-government-related investors. Our results have implications for PE
investors as well as for all other stakeholders of PE backed firms.
4INTRODUCTION
A substantial theoretical and empirical literature has explored how private equity (PE)
investors screen, select, finance and monitor their portfolio companies (e.g. Gompers, 1995;
Hellman & Puri, 2000 & 2002; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2001 & 2002; Lerner, 1995).  Most of
these studies focus on the dynamics of the relationship and the contractual arrangements
between PE investors and entrepreneurs. One aspect which received only minor attention so
far is the use of financial accounting information both in the pre-investment screening and the
post-investment monitoring period.
There exists questionnaire evidence indicating that PE investors rank, next to
entrepreneurial characteristics and market opportunities, both financial performance and
general accounting information as leading elements in screening and selecting potential
ventures (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; MacMillan et al., 1987; Wright & Robbie, 1998). Falconer
et al. (1995) report that PE investors are heavy users of financial statement information and
more specifically, that this information is a key component to evaluate the firm ex post.
Kaplan & Strömberg (2002) also stress the importance of financial and accounting measures
in the design of financial contracts between entrepreneurs and PE investors. Furthermore,
Manigart et al. (2000) show that when PE investors have a more financial or banking
background, they emphasize accounting and financial statement information even more as
well in the screening stage as in the monitoring ex post.
Given the key importance of financial accounting information in as well the screening
as the governance of PE portfolio firms, this raises the questions (i) whether entrepreneurs
actively manage reported earnings upward to attract PE investors and (ii) whether PE
investors’ governance affects the ex post financial reporting behavior of their companies
under portfolio. In this paper, we address these issues by studying pre- and post-investment
financial reporting characteristics of PE investors’ portfolio companies.
Empirical and anecdotal evidence indicates that accounting information is sometimes
used to mislead potential investors or to influence contract terms. For example, traditional
earnings management studies typically examine earnings behavior around specific corporate
events like initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), (convertible)
debt issues and debt covenant violations (for an extended literature overview, we refer to
Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Around these events, corporate incentives  to  manage earnings  are
likely to be high. In all above-mentioned situations, a company is better off with
reporting higher earnings figures before the event. IPOs and SEOs will have more chance of
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be avoided if companies are able to meet or beat a priori financial benchmarks. The empirical
literature provides evidence of intensified earnings management levels prior to the analyzed
event (e.g. DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry & Williams, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998a & b) .
In the case of PE financing, one can question whether entrepreneurs act in a similar
way and manage earnings upward when applying for PE. Given that PE investors pay
attention to the financial accounts of their portfolio companies, entrepreneurs might try to
present a better picture of their company to increase their chances of getting money. Our
empirical results are consistent with this prediction and show that earnings management
indeed is positively related to receiving PE financing.
Additionally, there is ample evidence that investments by professional PE investors
result in a substantial change in the corporate governance system in place to reduce
information asymmetry and moral hazard problems (e.g. Gompers, 1995; Kaplan &
Strömberg, 2003; Lerner, 1995; Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza et al., 1996). PE investors become
intensively involved in the management of their portfolio firms after the investment,
providing substantial support in their day-to-day activities and monitoring them rigorously
(e.g. Gompers, 1995; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002). Hellman & Puri (2002) document that the
change in governance coming from the PE investors’ involvement eventually affects the
professionalism by which portfolio companies operate. Here, we study one component of the
impact of tighter corporate governance rules, namely how the financial reporting discipline of
PE portfolio companies is affected. Consistent with findings of Falconer et al. (1995), we
expect losses in the post-investment period to be disclosed promptly, since these authors
report that PE investors’ main concern with respect to financial reporting is a timely
recognition of bad news. Following Basu’s (1997) definition, timely loss recognition reflects
a higher degree of earnings conservatism and can be seen as a direct result of the higher
legitimate demand for timely information (Ball & Shivakumar, 2002). Our findings are in line
with this proposition and highlight the substantial impact of PE investors on the financial
reporting discipline of their portfolio companies.
Finally, we study the impact of investor type on the post-investment financial
reporting discipline. Leleux & Surlemont (2003) have provided evidence that government-
related PE investors are worse monitors of their portfolio companies compared to non-
government PE investors. We argue that the tighter governance by non-government PE
investors will result in a more conservative financial reporting discipline for their portfolio
companies compared to companies backed by government-related PE institutions. Results are
6marginally significant suggesting that PE investors’ governance impact is not only manifest in
their financial reporting conservatism as a whole but that it is also partly determined by
investor type.
Our analyses are based on a unique hand-collected dataset of 556 Belgian PE backed
companies between 1985 and 1999, and a matched sample of non-PE backed companies. In
Belgium, both listed and unlisted companies have to report yearly financial statements.
Hence, we exploit a unique opportunity to study financial accounting data of unlisted
companies applying for and receiving PE financing in a longitudinal framework. By doing so,
we are able to study both entrepreneurial pre-investment earnings management behavior and
post-investment governance impact of PE investors on the financial reporting discipline
simultaneously.
We use multiple approaches to empirically analyze both earnings management and
earnings conservatism around the PE investment. First, earnings distributions as in
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) are examined to get a view of the
entrepreneurs’ attempts to record positive earnings, respectively earnings growth prior to the
PE financing date. We find that one year prior to PE financing, small earnings growth is
pursued. This finding is in contrast to previous years where small earnings declines are not
avoided. Second, cross-sectional regression analyses as in Teoh et al. (1998a & b) allow to
determine the magnitude of discretionary current accruals (a quantifiable measure for earnings
management) and to explore the difference over time between companies with and without
PE. Results are in line with expectations: we find substantial earnings management prior to
PE financing date and a more restrained earnings management behavior post-investment. The
matched sample results do not show systematic earnings management patterns in any of the
observed years. Third, we apply time-series measures on different sub-samples as in Basu
(1997) and Ball & Shivakumar (2002) to study post-investment earnings conservatism
patterns. Results are in line with the prediction that PE backed companies report losses more
timely than non-PE backed companies after the investment date, suggesting a higher degree of
earnings conservatism for PE backed companies. With respect to investor type, we find
indications that earnings conservatism tendencies are lower for companies backed by
government-related PE institutions compared to non-government PE backed companies,
although to a weaker extent.
This study contributes to the growing literature on earnings characteristics of PE
backed companies (Jain & Kini, 1995; Teoh et al, 1998a & b; Hochberg, 2002). These
studies, however, are limited to the period surrounding the IPO largely because of data
7unavailability before going public. However, it has been shown that PE presence is most
imperative at earlier stages of a company’s lifetime or when companies are not publicly listed
(Hellman & Puri, 2002). Bearing this in mind, we specifically choose to study data of unlisted
companies receiving PE. By doing so, we are not only able to unravel earnings management
attempts of entrepreneurs in the pre-PE financing period but also to study PE investors’
monitoring impact on one aspect of the corporate governance of their portfolio companies,
namely their financial reporting discipline. This study also builds on recent advances in the
corporate governance literature on the role of PE investors as monitors in the
professionalization process of a firm (Gompers, 1995; Hellman & Puri, 2002). We show that
the increased governance stemming from PE investors endogenously determines financial
reporting quality.
In this study, we specifically prefer to use the term PE rather than venture capital. This
designation is driven by the specific characteristics of our sample firms. According to the
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) definition, ‘venture capital’ is defined as a
“subset of private equity and refers to equity investments made for the launch, early
development, or expansion of a business.” PE is broader in meaning and is also used to define
external equity capital that is raised to strengthen a company’s balance sheet, to make
acquisitions or to finance a management buy-out or buy-in (EVCA Glossary). Since a
considerable number of observations refer to later stage deals and hence do not satisfy the
exact definition of venture capital, we use the term PE to label all our equity financed deals.
The remainder of this paper goes as follows. In section 2, hypotheses are developed. In
section 3, we describe our sample and the specific Belgian institutional context and provide
descriptive statistics. Empirical tests and results are presented in section 4. Section 5
concludes and discusses the study.
HYPOTHESES
Applying for and receiving outside equity financing is an important corporate event
that has impact beyond receiving additional financial resources. It affects the
professionalization of an individual firm (e.g. Hellman & Puri, 2002). Before the deal, firms
applying for PE financing have to advertise themselves to catch the interest of potential
investors. Once PE investors decide to invest in the company, its governance system typically
is reshaped to reduce information-asymmetry and moral hazard problems (Gompers, 1995;
Lerner, 1995; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002).  In the following section, we argue how both pre-
8investment screening and post-investment intensified governance may affect a company’s
financial reporting process, alternatively with respect to earnings management and earnings
conservatism.
PE investments and earnings management
Pre-investment
One major concern of firms which seek to raise PE financing is to showcase
themselves to potential investors. Typically, the search for capital is facilitated when firms are
able to show excellent market opportunities, competitive advantages or when a qualified and
dedicated entrepreneurial team is managing the company (e.g. Wright & Robbie, 1998).
However, next to these elements, financial figures are also key elements in the
screening process of investment opportunities. MacMillan et al. (1987) and Wright & Robbie
(1998) show that PE investors rank financial performance and general accounting information
next to entrepreneurial characteristics and market opportunities as leading elements in
screening and selecting possible investees. Fried & Hisrich (1994) report that over 80% of
their sample of US-based PE investors conduct an in-depth study of company financials
before taking on an investment deal. This figure is even higher for later stage deals.
Furthermore, Manigart et al. (2000) find that investors with a financial or banking background
emphasize accounting and financial statement information even more.
One might expect that companies looking for PE use all means available to present
their company in the best possible way. Given that financial statements are an important
determinant on which PE investors ground their investment decision, entrepreneurs might
manage earnings levels upward opportunistically prior to the deal. Moreover, we know that a
typical PE screening process is executed in multiple stages. In a first stage, PE investors
screen investment opportunities rather roughly, focusing only on some important benchmarks
such as market opportunities, business potential and financial profitability (Fried & Hisrich,
1994; Hall & Hofer, 1993). This first-round screening usually is executed by junior team
members and generally takes only a limited amount of time (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Hall &
Hofer, 1993). Only a small number of business proposals pass through the first screening
stage and detailed due diligence is performed on a limited number of potential deals in a
second evaluation round. Hence, it is important for PE seeking companies to survive the first
screening round and to be considered for a more intensive due diligence, which eventually
opens up the door to receiving PE funding. As a result, entrepreneurs who are well aware of
the way PE financiers screen their investment opportunities might focus specifically on
9providing an excellent first impression by exploiting financial reporting flexibility maximally.
Although past financial performance is only one element in the PE decision making process,
we argue that PE seeking companies will use all means available to present theirselves as
favorably as possible to the outside world.
Based on these arguments, our first hypothesis states that entrepreneurs actively try to
influence PE financiers’ financing decisions positively by managing earnings figures upward:
H1: “PE seeking companies manage earnings upward prior to the investment year”
However, it has empirically been shown that PE investors are professional parties who
cannot be fooled easily. Wright & Robbie (1998) find that PE investors have fairly
complicated screening and evaluation techniques to underpin their investment decision.
Moreover, since their selection is based on consecutive screening rounds and a thorough due
diligence process is executed to uncover both opportunities and potential threats of the
investment, one might wonder whether this earnings management behavior is not redundant.
PE investors often negotiate complex control rights at the time of their investment and
incorporate extensive governance and monitoring mechanisms (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002),
suggesting that potential earnings management attempts may be uncovered easily.
Even if earnings management attempts would not be unraveled prior to the deal, the
close monitoring after the investment suggests they can be detected in a later stage anyway.
As a result, it is unclear whether entrepreneurs would still try to manage their earnings
upward to catch the interest of PE investors even knowing that, once discovered, it might
harm the long-term mutual trust relationship between both parties. Given these conflicting
views, it is relevant to study whether entrepreneurs actively manage reported earnings upward
prior to the deal since this indeed may help them to attract the attention of PE investors but it
is very likely to be uncovered in further, more thorough due diligence screening.
Post-investment
Once the PE deal is done, the entrepreneur is no longer the exclusive owner of the
firm. The specific investor/investee relationship results in a typical principal-agent problem,
as described in Jensen & Meckling (1976). An entrepreneur’s private benefits are not always
perfectly aligned with outside investors' returns (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002).
Entrepreneurs could invest in projects with high personal benefits but low monetary returns
for investors, with the only goal to maximize personal wealth (Gompers, 1995).
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As a result, PE investors typically include monitoring devices in the investment
contract. E.g. arrangements between entrepreneurs and PE investors are typically negotiated
in financial contracts, describing control rights between both parties (Kaplan & Strömberg,
2002). PE investors monitor their investment firms by periodic evaluations of the project’s
status, incorporating options to abandon subsequent financing and putting VC representatives
in the board of directors (Lerner, 1995; Wright & Robbie, 1998). Other examples are
periodical check-ups of the day-to-day activities and prerequisite periodical financial reports
(e.g. Gompers, 1995). Furthermore, PE investors play a substantial role in shaping the
management team, developing a business plan, providing essential assistance in take-over
matters or in designing the executive compensation (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002; Sapienza et
al., 1996).
This intensified governance system put into place by the external investors results in
tight post-investment relationships between investors and entrepreneurs. We argue that this
enhanced monitoring and close involvement of the PE investor with the company itself
reduces post-investment financial reporting flexibility and, as such, reduces earnings
management possibilities. Consequently, the hypothesized upward earnings management
pattern prior to the investment date is expected to fade out after the investment date, resulting
in our second hypothesis:
H2: “After the investment, PE backed companies manage earnings substantially
less compared to before the investment”
However, the suggested upward earnings management behavior prior to the
investment has consequences for the observed earnings management in the following periods
and could potentially distort the interpretation of our second hypothesis. Dechow (1994),
amongst others, shows that artificially inflated earnings are most commonly realized by
aggressively recognizing unrealized accounting accruals.1 Advocates argue that accrual
accounting helps investors better in assessing firm values and true operating performance than
operating cash flows do (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Dechow, 1994). However, when
                                                  
1 National GAAP generally allow managers to report accounting earnings in an accrual accounting based system. This
accounting system is more flexible than the traditional cash accounting reporting and allows managers to shift revenues and
expenses into the period they are actually incurred. Hence, accrual accounting systems have the advantage of better
matching revenues and expenses, hereby allowing entrepreneurs to generate more value relevant accounting figures than
cash accounting would do (Ball & Brown, 1968; Dechow, 1994).
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applied opportunistically, accrual systems also allow managers to manage earnings figures
aggressively in certain time periods by shifting income between consecutive periods
(Dechow, 1994).
Given that hypothesis 1 predicts upward earnings management prior to the investment
deal and that this is most likely to be done by opportunistically overestimating accruals, the
natural behavior of accruals automatically results in a backlash after the objective has been
met (i.e. after the actual investment date). Consequently, if hypothesis 1 finds confirmation,
the natural behavior of accruals itself partly explains declining accruals in the post-investment
years. Hence, focusing solely on the earnings management behavior pre- and post-investment
date in isolation does not provide a uniform indication of a PE investor’s monitoring impact
on the company’s financial reporting process, and specifically so, since lower earnings
management levels ex post might be driven by intense pre-investment earnings management
attempts. Hence, we acknowledge the intertemporal dependence of our earnings management
measure and explore an additional attribute of earnings quality, namely earnings
conservatism. This extra measure allows us to study PE investors’ governance impact on their
portfolio companies' financial reporting more unambiguously.
PE INVESTMENTS AND EARNINGS CONSERVATISM
As documented in the previous section, PE investors put in place a more intense
governance and monitoring system and this, in turn, is expected to influence a company's
financial reporting discipline. In addition to earnings management, which shows the reliability
of a company’s financial statements and is generally seen as an important attribute of earnings
quality, we explore a second component of earnings quality, namely earnings conservatism.
We define earnings conservatism as in Basu (1997): "…earnings reflecting 'bad news'
more quickly than 'good news’ ". In other words, earnings are of a more conservative nature if
accounting losses are reported more quickly than profits (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2002). Ball and
Shivakumar (2002) note that timely loss recognition is an important attribute of earnings
quality which increases the efficiency of financial statements use, especially with respect to
governance issues. Corporate governance is affected since timely loss recognition gives
managers less flexibility to undertake negative NPV projects and hereby aligns the interests of
both the entrepreneur and the other stakeholders, among which PE investors.
We argue that, in this research context, intensified PE investors' governance may lead
to a more strict financial reporting discipline, specifically since Kaplan & Strömberg (2002)
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have shown that PE investors make control rights contingent upon financial as well as non-
financial measures. Consequently, it is likely that PE investors monitor their portfolio
company’s financial reporting process and apply quality standards to it, in order to receive
high quality accounting information. One imperative element for PE investors is receiving a
timely indication of difficulties, specifically since the distribution of control rights between
entrepreneurs and PE investors is often made contingent upon financial risk. Moreover,
Falconer et al. (1995) found in a UK questionnaire study that PE investors are primarily
concerned with receiving reliable and timely financial information from their investee firms.
This suggests that PE investors affect the financial reporting discipline by requiring their
investee firms to report losses timely to identify difficulties instantly, rather than leaving them
unidentified or carrying them forward to future periods.
Further, although the observed companies are private in nature and consequently are
expected to have a fairly low tendency to report earnings conservatively compared to public
companies (Ball & Shivakumar, 2002), we expect that PE investors’ governance positively
influences the extent of earnings conservatism. A higher earnings conservatism propensity
makes financial statements more useful for contracting, monitoring and valuation matters and
is expected to be more prevalent for PE backed compared to independently ran firms.
Additional evidence for this reasoning is that PE investors generally want to exit after a
number of years realizing a substantial surplus value on their investment (e.g. Gompers, 1995;
Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002). Therefore, PE investors typically prepare their portfolio firms
for a future sale which is made easier by presenting professional and reliable financial
statements. Hence, also this higher demand for high quality financial reporting by external
parties after the PE financing suggests a more predisposed conservatism in earnings reporting.
As a consequence, we expect to find more conservative earnings reporting in PE
backed firms compared to non-PE backed firms. This higher conservatism then would be a
direct result of the higher legitimate demand for financial reporting quality by the PE
investors. This leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: “PE backed companies report accounting losses more timely (i.e. report more
conservative earnings) compared to non-PE backed companies”
Finally, we argue that different types of PE investors have different governance skills
and incentives, which endogenously determine the earnings quality of their portfolio
companies. We therefore study whether the degree of earnings conservatism depends on the
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type of PE investor. More specifically, we study differences in earnings conservatism between
non-government and government-related PE investors.2
Managers of government-related PE investment companies are often civil servants and
as such may not have the experience nor the drive to select or support entrepreneurial
companies (Leleux & Surlemont, 2003; Manigart et al., 2002). Also fee-based incentive
packages of government-related PE houses typically create lower incentives to monitor their
investments tightly compared to profit-oriented incentive packages of non-government PE
firms (Leleux & Surlemont, 2003). In general, government-related PE houses are less
pressured to earn financial returns, as they do not have to raise new funds from the market and
may have other goals than value maximization for their shareholders. Moreover, government-
related PE investors encounter less pressure to exit firms with a substantial surplus value in
the shortest possible time and may therefore be typically less dedicated to professionalize
their portfolio company without delay.
Taking the specific characteristics of government-related PE investors into account,
their investment decisions might be driven more by a social point of view instead of a profit
maximization standpoint (Lerner, 1999). These arguments imply, directly and indirectly, that
companies backed by independent PE investors may be governed more rigorously and
adequately than those receiving PE from government-related agencies. Therefore, we expect
differences in governance to be reflected in the financial reporting discipline. Hence, we
expect higher earnings conservatism for companies funded by non-government-related PE
investors compared to those receiving government-related PE:
H4: “Companies backed by non-government-related PE investors report accounting
losses more timely (i.e. report more conservative earnings) compared to companies
backed by government-related PE investors”
In the next section, we describe the setting of our sample, namely the Belgian PE
context. We further illustrate the selection of the sample and report descriptive statistics.
                                                  
2 Non-government related PE investors are (1) firms investing funds from third parties and (2) captive funds, i.e. funds in
which the main shareholder of the management company contributes most of the capital from its own internal sources and
reinvests realized capital gains into the fund. Government-related PE firms invest government funds either directly or
indirectly in portfolio companies (EVCA Glossary).
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RESEARCH SETTING AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
We hand-collected financial and non-financial data of PE backed Belgian companies
that received PE financing between 1985 and 1999. PE deals were identified by financial
databases, PE investment reports and press releases. There are two reasons why we restricted
ourselves to the Belgian context.
First, all Belgian companies (both listed and non-listed) are obligated to file their
financial statement annually to the National Bank of Belgium in compliance with the Royal
Decree of 8 October 1976. This creates an excellent opportunity to study financial accounting
reporting behavior of unlisted companies. Using these data, we build a longitudinal database
containing financial accounting data of privately-held, unlisted companies receiving PE for
the first time. This provides us with a unique dataset which cannot be retrieved in a typical
research context –  like the US –  where this kind of financial data is unavailable for unlisted
companies. Although unlisted companies typically experience a lower demand for high
quality financial accounting compared to listed companies (e.g. Ball & Shivakumar, 2002),
their financial reporting discipline might be impacted by additional monitoring pressure from
the PE investors’ increased governance.
Second, the Belgian PE industry differs substantially from Anglo-Saxon and even
from other Continental European countries since nearly half of all PE investments come from
government-related PE firms (EVCA, various yearbooks). Therefore, by exploiting this
dataset we are able to explore differences in the financial reporting behavior between
companies that are backed by non-government and government-related PE investors.
The Belgian PE industry
Before the 1980s, Europe as a whole and the US were two different continents as
regards PE. The absence of a supportive entrepreneurial spirit combined with poor exit
alternatives offered by the stock market at that time, resulted in a substantial
underdevelopment of the European PE industry compared to the US. The European situation
was also observed in Belgium, where PE only gained importance after the 1980s. Evidence of
this juvenile character of the Belgian PE industry is clearly illustrated when comparing the
importance of the industry with respect to the size of the economy. During our observation
period 1985-1999, average Belgian PE investments totaled 0.06% of GDP. US figures are
substantially higher, reaching values of 3 to 4 times that size during the same period
(Manigart et al., 2002). Consistent with worldwide tendencies, the Belgian PE industry grew
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sharply, especially during the late 1990s’ bubble years to a maximum of 0.22% of GDP in
2000. Over the last two years, again following worldwide tendencies,  total PE investments
nearly halved to 0.12% of GDP in 2002.
The vast majority (58%) of PE during the observation period went to expansion
investments. Seed and start-up investments, replacement capital and buy-outs accounted for
respectively 26%, 9% and 7%. The most popular investment sector was high-tech related
(47%), according to EVCA definitions, “communications, computer and other electronics
related, biotech and medical or health related”. Industrial-related and consumer-related
sectors accounted for respectively 17% and 10% of all investments during that period.
With respect to investor type, the Belgian PE industry is further characterized by a
large number of small independent PE companies and a few large PE investment companies
(EVCA, various years). It is noteworthy that more than half of total investments made during
our observation period come from government-related PE investors. Both the Flemish GIMV
(Gewestelijke InvesteringsMaatschappij voor Vlaanderen) and the Walloon SRIW (Société
Régionale d’Investissement de Wallonie) account for a substantial part of these government-
related PE investments. Independent and captive investors both account for a mere 25% of
total investments.
Description of the sample
In order to construct a comprehensive sample of PE-backed companies, we used
existing databases and secondary sources such as yearly financial accounts, PE investment
reports and press releases. To be included in the sample, portfolio companies’ financial
statements have to be recorded on a regular basis in the database of the National Bank of
Belgium. Moreover, we excluded financial and holding companies because of the highly
specific nature of these firms. This resulted in a final sample of 556 companies, representing
nearly 40% of all PE investments in Belgium between 1985 and 1999.
To provide a basis for comparison, we selected a comparable sample of companies
that did not receive PE. Following Megginson & Weiss (1991), Jain & Kini (1995) and
Lerner (1999), each PE backed company is matched with a non-PE backed company on three
criteria in the year before investment: (i) activity –  measured by a two-digit sector code – ,
(ii) size – proxied by total assets – , and (iii) age. For firms receiving PE in the start-up year,
the matching year was set equal to the first year in which the financial statement data became
available, typically being the investment year. Descriptive statistics of both samples are given
in table 1.
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Insert Table 1 About Here
37% of the companies in the sample receive PE financing within 2 years following
their founding date ('start-ups'), 18% when they are between 2 and 5 years ('early stage') and
45% after more than 5 years ('later stage'). According to EVCA definitions, about half of the
sample companies can therefore be considered as having received pure venture capital
financing while the rest received PE of a more broader sense. Government-related investors
backed over 70% of the sample companies causing an overrepresentation compared to their
market share, which was slightly above 50% (EVCA statistics). Although government-related
as well as non-government-related PE investors finance a proportionally equal number of
early stage deals (for both about 18%), there is a considerable difference in the proportion of
start-up and later stage investments between both investor types. Government-related PE
investors finance approximately an equal percentage of start-up and later stage deals (41%
versus 43%). Non-government PE investors, by contrast, favor later stage deals above start-up
deals by far (53% versus 28%).
Panel B provides descriptive statistics of age and some basic accounting figures for
both samples under analysis, i.e. PE backed and non-PE backed over all observation years. PE
backed companies are on average 12.33 years old in the investment year, with a median age
of 7 years and the oldest firm in the sample being 74 years. Average (median) total assets are
EUR 11,786,642 (2,717,136) and vary between EUR 10,833 and  811,072,065 showing the
substantial variation in size of PE backed companies. Median growth in total assets equals
6.39% and the average (median) leverage figure is 69.88% (71.35%). Results of the non-PE
backed sample are rather similar. The average (median) non-PE backed company age is 14.38
(8.00) years, with a maximum of 91. Average (median) total assets equal EUR 7,257,799
(1,611,394) and vary between EUR 13,585 and 876,034,348. Median growth for non-PE
backed firms is somewhat lower compared to PE backed matches and equals 4.13%. Finally,
average (median) leverage is 66.73% (70.31%).
Panel C reports information on the industry classification of sample companies (one
and two-digit). PE investors typically invest in a limited number of industries. In accordance
with the investment sector profile of the entire Belgian PE industry, computer services
(16.91%), wholesale distribution (12.77%) and metal manufacturing (7.73%) are the most
important sectors in our sample.
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RESEARCH METHODS & EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Earnings Management Tests
Distribution tests
First, our study builds on distribution-based earnings management research as applied
in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999). In cross-sectional distributions
of scaled earnings and earnings changes of US companies, forementioned authors find
compelling evidence of discontinuously distributed earnings, showing abnormally high
frequencies of small profits and small earnings increases. Small losses and earnings decreases
are typically avoided. One main advantage of this research method is that it allows to detect
earnings management to achieve certain earnings targets, combining a visualization and a
statistical test on the magnitude of the discontinuity (McNichols, 2001). However, we
acknowledge that we have to proceed with the necessary caution when interpreting the
number of small profits versus small losses, especially since it is not clear what the
relationship in the absence of earnings management should be (Dechow et al., 2003).
We study whether PE backed companies report more small earnings, respectively
earnings increases, compared to matched non-PE backed companies and whether there is a
clearer earnings management pattern in pre-investment years compared to other years.
Consistent with Burgstahler & Dichev (1997), we measure the statistical significance of small
loss avoidance and small profit pursuance by calculating a standardized smoothness measure.
Under the null hypothesis, the earnings distribution is thought to be relatively smooth where
the expected number of observations in any given interval is the average of the number of
observations in the two immediately adjacent intervals (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997).3  This
statistical test measure is defined as follows:
                                                  
3  In constructing empirical histograms, researchers face the problem of choosing an optimal bin width that balances (i) the
need for a precise density estimate and (ii) the need for a fine resolution. Scott (1992) recommends a bin width that is
positively related to the variability in the data and negatively to the number of observations. High variation in the data calls
for wider bins and the number of observations determines the size of bin widths adversely. To calculate the optimal bin
width, we use a measure similar to the one used in Degeorge et al. (1999) and Plummer & Mest (2001). Bin width =




expectedactual NN - , where
Nactual  = actual number of observations in a given interval
Nexpected = expected number of observations, based on the average of the two adjacent intervals
s  = standard deviation of the difference between n° of observed and n° of expected observations 4
Table 2 confronts deflated profit after taxes levels of PE backed companies one year
before the PE investment with these of 2 or 3 year before the investment. Additionally, non-
PE backed profit after taxes levels from 1 to 3 years before participation are calculated to
provide a basis for comparison. Consistent with hypothesis 1, we argue that the closer a
company gets to its PE deal, the higher the probability will be to detect a more observable
upward earnings management pattern. More specifically, for our PE backed sample we expect
to find unusually few small losses and earnings declines one year before participation
compared to earlier years. Additionally, earnings distributions of our control sample are not
subject to similar earnings management incentives in any observation year, suggesting less
systematic earnings management over all observation years. Therefore, we pool all matched
pre-investment earnings levels from year –3 to –1 and consider these as normal, expected
earnings levels. Any substantial difference for the PE backed earnings sample from these
‘benchmark’ earnings distribution then again could be an indication of earnings management.
Tests statistics with respect to loss avoidance for both our PE backed and non-PE
backed sample are presented in table 2. Results show significantly more than expected small
profits and abnormally few small losses for all observation years. These quasi-identical
earnings distribution patterns for both our PE backed and matched sample suggest that,
although there exist clear loss avoidance behavior for the PE backed sample, this is not
systematically more intense closer the PE financing event nor compared to control sample
earnings.
Insert Table 2 About Here
                                                  
4 The standardized difference is based the following formula (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997): s² = N.pi.(1 - pi) + ¼.N.(pi-1 +
pi+1).(1 - pi-1 - pi+1), where N = number of observations, pi = the probability that an observation falls in interval i,  pi-1 = the
probability that an observation falls in interval (i-1) and pi+1 = the probability that an observation falls in interval (i+1).
(1)
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Analyses of earnings changes, however, show more clear evidence of earnings
management behavior close to PE investment date. Both table 3 and figure 1 show that while
PE backed companies still incur significantly more than expected small earnings declines two
and three years before participation, this pattern changes considerably one year prior to
participation into significantly more than expected small earnings growth observations. This
shift from abnormally many small earnings decreases to an unusually high number of small
earnings increases close to approaching the participation date is a first indication that, at that
time, managers might use earnings management techniques to achieve small improvements in
reported profit.
Insert Table 3  About Here
Insert Figure 1 About Here
In summary, earnings distribution results provide only limited evidence of upward
earnings management of PE backed companies close to PE investment date, specifically since
loss avoidance behavior is similar over all observation years for as well the PE backed as the
control sample. Further, the tendency of PE applying companies to report small increases in
earnings does indicate that entrepreneurs attempt to record improvements in earnings
performance one year prior to the PE investment. However, given the limitations of this
research method and the caution by which it has to be interpreted, we consider these
distribution tests more as tentative indications of earnings management and evaluate earnings
management behavior more in-depth by running accrual regressions hereafter.5
Accruals modeling
In a second step, we apply the most commonly used earnings management measure
and study unexpected discretionary accruals as an indicator of earnings management.6
                                                  
5 For the sake of brevity we do not report earnings distributions post PE investment date. Specifically since these
distributions do not show significant discrepancies between both samples.
6  McNichols (2001) reports that up to 1999, over 45% of all earnings management studies published in leading accounting
journals were developed by using a variant of the accruals model.
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Discretionary accruals are a commonly used proxy for measuring the degree of
earnings management in a company's financial figures. Companies use accruals as accounting
adjustments to distinguish reported earnings from cash flow from operations. Part of these
accruals are inherent to the business activities of the company and part come from
discretionary decisions of managers (e.g. Jones, 1991; Dechow, 1994). Accrual-based
research intends to unveil this discretionary component of accruals and considers it as an
indicator for earnings management. Although this kind of research has been criticized because
of its underlying assumptions, no superior research method has been introduced yet. As a
consequence, we rely on the discretionary accruals modeling together with the distributional
tests to provide us with the best estimate available of the earnings management incidence.
We apply a cross-sectional regression model as in Teoh et al. (1998a & b), which is an
extension of the most widely used earnings management model, the Jones (1991) model.
Although the original Jones model studies short term as well as long term discretionary
accruals, we focus on short-term working capital accruals since managers have greater
flexibility and control over current versus long term accruals (Teoh et al., 1998a & b). More
specifically, current accruals are computed as follows:
Current accruals = D (accounts receivable + inventory + other current assets)
 – D (accounts payable + tax payable + other current liabilities)
Since accruals by itself are not necessarily evidence of earnings management, these
current accruals have to be modeled into (1) non-discretionary accruals, which inherently
result from the natural changes in business activities and (2) discretionary accruals, which are
made at the discretion of management. Expected non-discretionary current accruals are
estimated by running cross-sectional regressions of current accruals on the change in net
added value of all available sector peers for the accruals decomposition.7 We require that
                                                  
7 This estimation is a variant on the normally used model which uses sales growth as an explanatory factor instead of growth
in net added value. The reason for this change is that Belgian SMEs are allowed to report abbreviated financial statements
when they comply with the following requirements. A company should (1) employ less than 100 employees on average per
year registered or (2) not meet two or more of the following criteria: (i) annual turnover > 6,250,000 euro, (ii) balance sheet
total > 3,125,000 euro and (iii) average number of employees > 50. One major difference between abbreviated and
complete financial statements is that sales levels only have to be disclosed in complete financial statements. In abbreviated
formats, only a net added value is reported. This value equals (Operating Income [financial statement item 70/74] – Raw
Materials and Consumables [item 60] –  Services and Other Goods [item 61]). Given that over 60% of our sample firms
report an abbreviated statement, we use net added value figures to avoid ample missing data in our estimations.
(2)
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every company under investigation is present in the sample at year –2 and calculate the level
of discretionary current accruals from two years before until two years after the PE
investment (i.e. 5 consecutive years). Sector peers are selected on a two-digit sector
specification. We used a one-digit sector specification if less than 7 individual peer companies
were available for the industry-specific regression. Furthermore, data of a sector peer member
are only included in the accruals estimation when it (1) did not receive PE financing or (2) did
receive PE financing but only for years outside the 5 year time scope around the PE
investment. We follow Teoh et al. (1998a & b), amongst others, and winsorize the top and
bottom 1% of discretionary current accruals observations to minimize the impact of outliers.
Since these accruals estimations are executed over a 5-year time frame from two years
before until two years after the PE investment, the number of observations both in the PE
backed and the non-PE backed sample are limited. Descriptives showed that 205 companies
are younger than 2 years, reducing the number of available companies to 361. Further, a
substantial number of companies had missing data on parts of the added value measure,
making it impossible to calculate this measure. As a result, we have 166 remaining
observations for the PE backed sample and 160 for the non-PE backed sample. Further
specifications on these accruals estimations can be found in Appendix 1.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Table 4 presents median discretionary current accruals levels for both our PE backed
and our matched sample in a time frame of 2 years before until 2 years after the participation.
Median discretionary current accruals levels of PE backed companies are significantly
positive around the investment year. From one year before until one year after the investment,
we find a significantly higher earnings management level in our PE backed sample compared
to the non-PE backed sample. Discretionary accruals grow from +2.13% two years before the
investment date to a maximum value of +4.05% in the participation year, before dropping off
to an insignificant average of +1.15% two years after the investment. The non-PE backed
sample has lower median discretionary accruals values overall, being insignificantly different
from zero for all observation years. Moreover, p-values measuring the difference in median
discretionary current accruals between both samples are highly significant in the years around
the PE financing.
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Consistent with the findings of Teoh et al. (1998a & b), earnings figures seem to be
massaged upward prior to the event and discretionary current accruals are commonly used to
achieve this goal. This finding is consistent with our first hypothesis. Discretionary current
accruals become significantly positive one year before the PE investment, reach a maximum
in the event year and remain significantly positive until one year after the event. In contrast to
Teoh et al. (1998a & b) we do not find significantly positive discretionary current accruals
two years after the PE investment date. This is in line with our second hypothesis. Increased
PE investors’ governance may affect a company’s financial reporting discipline, since
discretionary current accruals decrease substantially and become insignificantly different from
zero two years after the investment year on.
However, there are a number of factors which might make some firms more likely to
manage earnings than others. To disentangle the importance of potential omitted variable bias,
we model discretionary current accruals as a function of some additional control variables:
iiiLEViIBXiageisizeiPEii INDLeverageIBXagesizePEDCA ebbbbba +Q++D++++=
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where DCA equals the level of discretionary current accruals for the firm in a specific
observation year. PE  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when a firm is PE backed and
0 otherwise to edge out the effect of receiving PE financing. Ln(size) is the natural logarithm
of total assets while ln(age) is the natural logarithm of the firms’ age. We do not predict any
specific sign for both our size and age variable. On the one hand, larger firms typically may
have more complex financial accounting techniques available to manage earnings. On the
other hand, larger firms are typically more politically visible than smaller firms, suggesting a
lower proportion of earnings management (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Equally, older
firms may on the one hand have more expertise to exploit flexibility in accounting
mechanisms but, conversely, have a longer track record making it less easy to disguise
accounting irregularities. D(IBX) measures change in income before extraordinary items from
the previous fiscal year to this year, scaled by the lagged total assets. This variable is included
to control for any misspecification resulting from potential correlation between discretionary
accruals and operating performance (Dechow et al., 1995). Leverage equals (1 – BV
Equity/TA), with ‘BV Equity’ being the book value of equity and ‘TA’ is total assets. The
higher a firm’s leverage, the less own resources a firm uses to finance its business activities
and/or the higher the level of outstanding debt. Consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis,
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we expect a positive relation between the leverage ratio and the extent of earnings
management (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). Finally, IND controls for industry fixed effects
(one-digit sector codes). We run yearly control regressions over all observation years from (t–
2) to (t+2).
We further control for potential endogeneity problems that might result from the
selection bias inherent in receiving PE. Even if PE has no effect on discretionary accruals, the
PE coefficient might still be significant if PE backed firms are those that were less likely to
have high discretionary accruals a priori. As a result, the coefficients in model (3) might be
biased, unless we adjust for this endogeneity problem. We therefore extend our model (3)
with a selection model based on the Heckman two-step regression (1979), as also applied in
Hellman & Puri (2002) and Hochberg (2002). More details on the Heckman selection model
are given in Appendix 2.
Insert Table 5 About Here
Table 5 reports coefficients and t-statistics of the Heckman 2 step regression model,
controlling for firm-specific characteristics and selection biases. We find a strong positive
relation between being PE-backed and the level of discretionary accruals around the
investment year.8 Although discretionary accruals and PE are unrelated two years before the
investment year, the link becomes highly significant from the pre-investment year on. We
find further evidence in line with hypothesis 1: entrepreneurs report higher discretionary
accruals shortly before the PE investment. Also one year before the PE investment, we find
that discretionary current accruals are positively related to age: younger firms report higher
accruals. No other significant relations are detected in the pre-investment year.
In the investment as well as in post-investment years, the coefficient on PE remains
positive although it is declining both in magnitude and significance. This suggests that the PE
investor’s governance impact restrains a portfolio firm’s ex post earnings management
behavior. Although this provides evidence for our second hypothesis, we acknowledge that
                                                  
8 Unreported coefficients of the standard OLS regression show that both the coefficient and the significance of the PE
variable is lower in all observation years, suggesting that selection bias is driving the uncorrected results and
underestimates the impact of receiving PE.
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the reversal of accruals might partly drive our results. Furthermore, the relation between age
and the level of discretionary accruals becomes less clear: while younger firms typically
report higher discretionary accruals in the investment year, this relation is reversed in year
+2. Finally, both one and two years after the PE investment, a higher leverage coincides with
lower discretionary accruals. This evidence contradicts the debt covenant hypothesis but
might be explained by the higher monitoring taking place both by the PE investor and other
creditors (such as banks). This tighter monitoring may actually limit a portfolio firm’s
financial reporting flexibility leading to a lower level of reported accruals. No further
significant relations are detected.
The result of the two-step regression, controlling for selection bias, is remarkable in
that it shows that PE investors actually select companies with a higher level of discretionary
accruals. This is similar to the findings in Hochberg (2002) and shows that PE investors are
more willing to invest in firms which are likely to report earnings with some aggression or
even over-confidence (Hochberg, 2002). This finding can be interpreted in two different
ways. One explanation is that PE investors are potentially unable to detect aggressive accruers
and therefore, aggressive accruers have higher chances of being selected than conservative
accruers. Another plausible explanation is that PE investors do observe the level of earnings
management a priori but that they simply do not mind the high accruals. Given their
professionalism and the thoroughness of the due diligence screening, it is likely that they
indeed see through this earnings management and take it into account in the valuation of the
company.9
In summary, all analyses are consistent with our first hypothesis that PE backed firms
manage earnings prior to participation date. Firms which receive PE backing have, on
average, high discretionary accruals both in the fiscal years before and even in the PE
investment year itself.  Hypothesis 2, suggesting a lower level of earnings management after
PE investment date also finds confirmation. We observe a decline in median discretionary
accruals from 2 years after the PE investment although additional tests show that this result
may, at least partly, be driven by firm-specific factors. Although these findings might partly
be driven by reversing accruals, this evidence also suggests that PE investors’ governance
limits portfolio company’s earnings management behavior ex post.
                                                  
9  However, since we do not have data on the exact pricing of the deals we cannot examine this relationship further.  Hence,
it remains an open question whether and if so, to what extent, PE investors are fooled by this accruals management or take
it into account in the valuation of the firm.
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EARNINGS CONSERVATIVENESS TESTS
We investigate an additional component of earnings quality by focusing on earnings
conservatism to unravel the governance impact of PE investors’ on a company’s financial
reporting behavior. Strictly spoken, earnings are of a more conservative nature if losses are
recognized timely instead of being spread over several periods (Basu, 1997). To some extent,
a higher degree of earnings conservatism coincides with a higher earnings quality since
conservative financial statements are more relevant for creditors, shareholders, managers  and
other external parties (Ball et al., 2000; Watts, 2002).
To estimate differences in earnings conservatism we apply a variant of the Ball &
Shivakumar model (2002), based on the conservatism principle of Basu (1997). Earnings
conservatism generally is seen as an important attribute of the overall earnings quality and
implies that bad news is recognized more timely than good news (Ball et al., 2000; Ball &
Shivakumar, 2002). Hence, earnings are thought to be of a higher quality if bad news events
reflected in current earnings level appear as transitory shocks or one-time dips and good news
events appear as persistent shocks to the earnings stream (Basu, 1997). As in Ball &
Shivakumar (2002), we measure timely loss incorporation in accounting income by focusing
on the tendency for income decreases to reverse. Therefore, the first-order serial dependence
in earnings changes is allowed to be dependent on the conditional sign of the prior earnings
change (Ball & Shivakumar, 2002). This method allows us to separately identify transitory
gain and loss components. If prior-period decreases exhibit a higher tendency to reverse than
prior-period earnings increases, this provides evidence of a higher willingness to recognize
losses timely and signals a higher earnings conservatism. Detecting a higher degree of
earnings conservatism for PE backed companies then would provide additional evidence of
disciplining PE investors’ governance impact on the financial reporting process.
We analyze conservatism tendencies in (1) current profits before taxes, but after
financial income (CP), (2) profit before taxes and after extraordinary income (PBT) and (3)
profit after taxes (PAT). We focus on various earnings levels for two reasons. First, it gives us
a more complete picture of the earnings conservatism tendency in reported earnings then
focusing on one earnings line in isolation. Second, by differentiating between subsequent
earnings levels, we are able to study the use of extraordinary items in an attempt to report
conservative bottom line earnings. Transitory gain and loss components are estimated by
running the following regression model:
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with: DNIt = income level change at time t, scaled by beginning-of-the-year book value of
total assets
DNIt-1  = income level change at time t-1, scaled by beginning-of-the-year book value of total
assets
NEG(DNI) t-1  = dummy variable taking the value of 1 when prior-period earnings changes are negative
By making the estimation model dependent on prior period earnings decreases, we are
able to study the reversion tendency of losses and gains separately. Timely recognition of
losses implies a statistically negative slope coefficient for (b2 + b3). Further, losses are
recognized in a more timely way than gains if b3 < 0. Finally, untimely recognition of gains
implies smooth earnings patterns, where gains are incorporated in income only if the
underlying cash flows are realized. Hence, gains tend to show up as being permanent,
implying that the slope coefficient on prior period positive earnings changes (b2) is positive,
i.e. non-reversing in nature.
Consistent with other earnings conservatism studies (Ball et al., 2000; Ball &
Shivakumar, 2002; Basu, 1997), model properties are defined at earnings changes and not its
level to correctly identifying the transitory components in income. However, working with
earnings levels requires 3 subsequent earnings levels to estimate model (4). Therefore, we are
unable to study differences in earnings conservatism pre- and post-investment date since we
generally have only 2 years of earnings data available before the PE financing date. Hence,
we focus specifically on differences in earnings conservatism between different subsamples in
the post-investment year.10 By means of introduction, we report fairly detailed descriptives of
our observed sample in Table 6.
Insert Table 6 About Here
Table 6, panel A reports descriptives for the entire sample, i.e. all available
observations from the investment year on, for PE backed as well as non-PE backed firms.
Mean (median) total assets are EUR 11,811,194 (2,815,549). Although we winsorized the top
                                                  
10 Although we are limited to analyzing earnings figures in the post-financing period, we are still able to include sufficient
observations in our research since earnings levels are available for all sample companies. Hence, unlike the accruals
estimation in the previous section, we are not limited to study only those companies which report added value.
(4)
27
and bottom 1% of outliers, we still have rather high values in the sample resulting in a right-
skewed distribution.11 Sales levels are only available for 2,952 out of the 4,202 observations
in the analyzed sample. Average (median) sales on total assets are 102.25% (83.04%). For all
observed income levels, approximately 70% of the income levels are positive and 30% have
negative values. Median income levels vary between 2.56% (PBT) and 1.39% (PAT) of total
assets. Table 6, panel B contains values for PE backed firms only. All descriptives are
relatively similar to descriptives of the entire sample in panel A.
PE backed versus non-PE backed firms
To test our third hypothesis, we supplement model (4) with a dummy to allow for
differences between PE backed and non-PE backed companies. Algebraically, this results in
the following model (5):
15411312110 )(**)()( ----- D++DD+D+D+=D tttttt NINEGPEPENININEGNININEGNI bbbbba
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with: DNIt = income level change at time t, scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets
DNIt-1 = income level change at time t-1, scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets
NEG(DNI)t-1 = dummy for prior-period negative income level change
PE = dummy for receiving PE, taking the value 1 if the company is PE backed
When interpreting the coefficients, we are mainly interested in differences in earnings
conservatism between PE backed and non-PE backed firms. Therefore, our discussion will
primarily focus on (b6+b7) which measures the compound effect for differences in timely loss
reporting between both samples. Table 7 gives an overview of the expected sign of individual
and compound coefficients’ signs.
Insert Table 7 & 8 About Here
                                                  




Table 8 reports regression results of running model (4) and (5) on all available
observations, in the post-financing years (n=4,062). First, panel A shows that the explanatory
power of model (4) is negligible for the CP level but reaches 6.48% for PBT and 6.83% for
PAT. Furthermore, the slope coefficient for b3 is significantly negative indicating that for PE
backed and for non-PE backed firms losses are, on average, recognized more timely than
gains. Further, the compound effect (b2 + b3) is significantly negative for all three earnings
levels suggesting timely loss recognition in general. We also find a significantly positive
slope coefficient for b2 for as well PBT as PAT. This indicates that positive earnings are not
only smoothed over time but also have a tendency to grow year-on-year.
Table 8, panel B reports regression coefficients and t-statistics of model (5) and shows
an increase in adjusted R² both for PBT (8.46%) and PAT (8.43%). As hypothesized, we find
significant differences between both sub-samples. The compound coefficient for (b6+b7) is
significantly negative for both PBT (–0.541) and for PAT (–0.825), suggesting that PE backed
companies report losses more timely compared to non-PE backed companies, consistent with
our third hypothesis. Further, slope coefficients for b2 and b3 become insignificantly different
from zero, suggesting that non-PE backed companies do not have a tendency to report losses
timely. Generally, these regression results provide clear evidence in line with our third
hypothesis.
Government versus non-government PE backed firms
We additionally expand model (4) by adding a dummy to control for differences in
earnings conservatism between companies that received PE financing from non-government
PE investors versus companies backed by government-related PE investors. Therefore, model
(6) goes as follows:
15411312110 )(**)()( ----- D++DD+D+D+=D tttttt NINEGGOVGOVNININEGNININEGNI bbbbba
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with: DNIt = income level change at time t, scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets
DNIt-1 = income level change at time t-1, scaled by beginning-of-the-year total assets
NEG(DNI)t-1 = dummy for prior-period negative income level change
GOV = dummy taking the value of 1 when PE investor = government-related backer
Insert Table 9 About Here
(6)
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Similar to the results of (5), we are primarily interested in differences in timely loss
reporting between our two subsamples under analysis, namely government PE backed versus
non-government PE backed firms. First, Table 9, panel A reports regression coefficients and
t-statistics of model (4) on the PE backed sample only (n=2,062). The explanatory power of
the model is negligible for the CP level and has only low power for both PBT and PAT levels.
Nevertheless, results are in line with the findings of the regressions above. PE backed
companies report losses in a timely fashion since slope coefficients for (b2+b3)  are
significantly negative for all three income levels.
Table 9, Panel B shows differences in timely loss reporting between companies
financed by government PE backed versus non-government PE backed companies. Here,
coefficient  (b2+b3) indicates the tendency of firms backed by non-government related PE
investors to report losses timely. For both PBT and PAT earnings levels, we find a
statistically significant negative coefficient, suggesting that the earlier found relation of timely
loss reporting persists for the non-government PE backed subsample. Further, (b6+b7) is
marginally significantly positive. This indicates that firms which are backed by government-
related PE investors recognize losses less timely compared to non-government PE backed
firms and provides evidence for our fourth hypothesis. This could be interpreted as evidence
that the specific characteristics of the government-related PE investors and its accompanied
weaker governance is reflected in a somewhat less conservative financial reporting discipline
compared to financial reporting of non-government related PE investors.
We apply several robustness checks on the data by adjusting the winsorizing
percentage and by constructing different sub-samples (e.g. non-government PE backed versus
non-PE backed, government PE backed versus non-PE backed) and all results remain
qualitatively equal. The general observation that CP levels, in contrast to PBT and PAT, do
not show tendencies of timely loss reporting denotes the importance of extra-ordinary income
as an instrument to achieve timeliness in financial reporting. We leave this finding to further
assessment in future studies.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine both entrepreneurial tendencies to manage earnings upward
prior to receiving PE and the governance impact of PE investors on the portfolio companies’
financial reporting discipline ex post. To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine
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financial statement information of companies receiving PE financing around their initial
financing year. Results are obtained by running both earnings management and earnings
conservatism tests.
We hand-collected a dataset of 556 Belgian companies receiving PE financing
between 1985 and 1999, next to a matched set of non-PE backed firms. Belgian accounting
legislation requires all firms (listed and unlisted) to file their  financial statements annually
and therefore provides us with an excellent research design to explore financial reporting
trends of unlisted companies, both before as after the PE investment year. The characteristics
of this dataset enable us not only to study entrepreneurial earnings management behavior
around the investment date but also to observe the PE investor’s governance impact on the
quality of the financial reporting process ex post.
First, this paper deals with the information content of financial statements in the PE
investor’s screening process. We evaluate earnings management behavior in a previously
unexplored research setting, namely around the PE investment date. Prior evidence on
earnings management behavior of PE backed companies was merely situated around the IPO
event. This study extends the traditional research context, by analyzing entrepreneurial
earnings management attempts to catch PE investors’ interest. Results clearly indicate that
entrepreneurs manage earnings prior to the PE financing. We interpret this as evidence that
entrepreneurs try to catch PE investors’ attention by showing their increasing profitability. It
remains, however, an open question to what extent PE investors see through this earnings
management and take it into account when valuing the firm.
Second, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the governance role played
by PE investors in the professionalization process of their portfolio companies. We show that
PE investors indeed play a value-added role in influencing portfolio companies’ financial
reporting discipline. Not only do we find a less noticeable earnings management behavior
after the financing year, PE backed firms also report earnings in a more conservative way
compared to non-PE backed firms. Although the lower earnings management measure might
partly be driven by the reversal behavior of accounting accruals, the higher conservatism
clearly points at a more mature and reliable financial reporting discipline. Furthermore,
financial reporting governance is also determined by investor type. The lower degree of
earnings conservatism in government-related PE backed firms is interpreted as evidence in
line with the arguments of Leleux & Surlemont (2003) and Lerner (1999) that government-
related PE investors are less professional compared to non-government PE investors in
monitoring their portfolio firms.
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Our findings are subject to some caveats. First, we measure earnings quality by
focusing on two aspects of it, namely earnings management and earnings conservatism. These
instruments cover only partly a company’s financial reporting quality. However, Ball &
Shivakumar (2002) argue that earnings quality is an abstract concept and that measuring one
single attribute of it is already indicative of the overall earnings quality. Hence, this multi-
method research design allows to understand more of a company’s financial reporting quality
than by applying only one research method in isolation. Second, we acknowledge that
companies which are able to attract PE financing have highly specific individual
characteristics potentially leading to biased results. Specifically, the selection of matched non-
PE backed companies raises concerns about endogeneity bias. We try to tackle this potential
distortion in our data by applying a two-step regression as per Heckman (1979) leading to
even stronger results. However, since it is difficult to control for all potential differences
between both samples, we acknowledge that omitted firm-specific characteristics might still
drive the accruals estimations partly.
Our results are important for several parties. First, our results are important for PE
investors since we show that entrepreneurs manage earnings upward when applying for PE
and that reported accounting figures have to be interpreted with the necessary caution.
However, it remains an open question to what extent PE investors are fooled by this earnings
management or simply see through it, given their professionalism they are operating with.
Second, our results are important for all stakeholders that use financial statement information
of PE backed companies. Although PE backed and non-PE backed companies are subject to
similar legal reporting requirements, earnings of PE backed companies are reported in a
substantially more conservative way. This conservatism tendency is even higher for non-
government-related PE backed firms, suggesting the more stringent governance of this kind of
PE investors to be reflected in their financial reporting discipline. Further research with
respect to the governance impact on PE portfolio firms’ financial reporting discipline is
required to explore the generalization of our results.
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Appendix 1: Accruals Estimation
To estimate the expected (i.e. non-discretionary) current accruals of a firm at a specific

































, 1  ,
with: CAj,t = current accruals for sector j at time t
DNAVj,t = change in net added value for sector j at time t
DTRj,t = trade receivables growth for sector j at time t
TAj,t-1 = beginning of the year total assets for sector j at time t
This estimation is a variant on the modified Jones model (by Dechow et al., 1995)
with sales growth as an explanatory factor instead of growth in net added value. The reason
for this modification is that Belgian SMEs are allowed to report abbreviated financial
statements when they comply with the following requirements. A company should (1) employ
less than 100 employees on average per year registered or (2) not meet two or more of the
following criteria: (i) annual turnover > 6,250,000 euro, (ii) balance sheet total > 3,125,000
euro and (iii) average number of employees > 50. One major difference between abbreviated
and complete financial statements is that sales levels are only compulsory in complete
financial statements. In abbreviated formats, a net added value is reported. This value equals
(Operating Income – Raw Materials and Consumables–  Services and Other Goods). Given
that over 60% of the sample reports an abbreviated statement, we use net added value figures
to avoid ample missing data.
Further, we calculate the level of non-discretionary current accruals for an individual
firm i for each observation year t by using the estimated coefficients, â0  and â1 of model (i)



































with: NDCAi,t = non-discretionary current accruals for firm i at time t
DNAVi,t = change in net added value for firm i at time t
DTRi,t = trade receivables growth for firm i at time t
TAi,t-1 = beginning of the year total assets of firm i at time t
Finally, the discretionary current accrual component for firm i at time t is the












Appendix 2: Two-step Heckman Correction Test
The two step Heckman correction test employs a two-equation model in an attempt to
control for potential selection bias in the data. Heckman (1979) showed that regression results
might be contaminated by selection bias but that one can simply correct for it by running a
two-step equation model.
In our setting, the first equation is a probit regression which models the probability of
receiving PE as a function of intrinsic characteristics of the observed companies. We
identified 5 characteristics which might distinct PE backed firms significantly from non-PE
backed firms:
























0 )()(           (iv)
‘Change in total assets’ (=DTA) measures the growth characteristics of all sample
companies and controls for potential differences in growth characteristics between our PE
backed and non-PE backed sample. ‘Gearing’ quantifies the solvency situation of a company.
We expect the gearing ratio to differ substantially between both groups since PE backed firms
have higher financing needs than non-PE backed matched equivalents prior to the PE
investment date. ‘Accumulated profit’ (=Accprofit) deflated by total assets measures the




backed firms to have lower internally generated profits. Investments, deflated by total assets
measures the investment profile of both samples. We incorporate this measure since anecdotal
evidence shows that PE backed companies typically have a higher investment rate compared
to non-PE applicants. Finally, Cash relative to assets measures cash available. Specifically in
the pre-investment period, this figure is expected to differ substantially between both sets.
The estimates of this probit model are used to compose the inverse Mills ratio. This
ratio is set equal to the hazard function of being selected for receiving PE. Algebraically: l(Z)
= f(Z)/T(Z), with f(Z) = the standard normal probability distribution function and T(Z) = the
standard normal cumulative distribution function. If selection bias is driving the results, the
error terms of the probit regression and the original test model are typically correlated.
The second equation is based on the original OLS model, taking into account the
effect of the inverse Mills ratio: i.e. the effect of being selected. By estimating both equations
simultaneously, we can retrieve the unbiased estimate of the coefficient on the PE variable
and isolate the effect of selection.
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TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics of  PE Backed and non-PE backed Companies
Panel A: PE Investor Origin and Stage of Financing *
Investor type Start-up stage Early stage Later stage Total
Non-government related 43 29 81 153 (28%)
Government related 162 71 170 403 (72%)
Total 205 (37%) 100 (18%) 251 (45%) 556 (100%)
*  Note: We split the sample in non-government related private equity (PE) backed firms and government-related PE
backed firms since the Belgian PE industry is typically known as being government-driven. Non-government PE investors
are (1) private firms investing funds from third parties as well as (2) captive funds, i.e. funds in which the main
shareholder of the management company contributes most of the capital from its own internal sources and reinvests
realized capital gains into the fund. Government-related PE firms invest government funds either directly or indirectly in
PE applicants (source: EVCA Glossary). Further, companies are defined as start-ups when they are younger than two
years at the time of participation. Early stage companies are between 3 and 5 years old and later stage companies are
older than 5 years.
Panel B: Descriptives of Age, Total Assets , Growth in Assets and Leverage*
 PE backed sample N Mean Median Min. Max.
Age 4435 12.33 7 0 74
Total Assets 4435 11,786,642 2,717,136 10,833 811,072,065
Asset Growth 4435 19.26% 6.39% -80.33% 465.17%
Leverage 4435 69.88% 72.35% 3.53% 308.59%
 Non-PE backed sample
n Mean Median Min. Max.
Age 4784 14.38 9 0 91
Total Assets 4784 7,257,799 1,611,394 13,585 876,034,348
Asset Growth 4784 12.52% 4.13% -69.98% 379.89%
Leverage 4784 66.73% 70.31% 1.93% 193.36%
*  Note: Descriptives come from the PE backed and non-PE backed sample separately and contain values of all specific
observation years. We filtered the top and bottom 1% outliers to avoid distorting impact of outliers. ‘Age’ corresponds to
the average age in the PE investment year. Next to total assets, also asset growth is calculated to denote the growth
characteristics of both samples. Asset growth is measured as (Total Assetst – Total Assetst-1)/( Total Assetst-1). Leverage
shows the solvency situation of a company and is computed as follows: (1- BV Equity/Total Assets), with BV of Equity
being the Book Value of Equity.
Panel C: Sector Distribution *
Sector code Industry Frequency % Cum. %
01 Agriculture and hunting 2 0.36 0.36
02 Forestry 1 0.18 0.54
03 Fishing 3 0.54 1.08
14 Mineral Oil refining 1 0.18 1.26
10-19 Energy and water 1 0.18 1.26
21 Extraction and preparation of metal sources 1 0.18 1.44
22 Production and preliminary processing of
metals
5 0.90 2.34
23 Extraction of minerals (other than metallic and
energetic)
2 0.36 2.70
24 Manufacture of non-metallic minerals 12 2.16 4.86
25 Chemical industry 13 2.34 7.20
20-29 Chemical industry 33 5.94 7.20
31 Manufacture of metal articles 43 7.73 14.93
41
32 Mechanical engineering 17 3.06 17.99
33 Electrical engineering 4 0.72 18.71
34 Manufacturing of motor vehicles/parts 34 6.12 24.82
35 Manufacturing of other means of transport 5 0.90 25.72
36 Instrument engineering 2 0.36 26.08
37 Manufacturing of fine metals 4 0.72 26.80
30-39 Metal manufacture: mechanical, electrical
and instrument engineering
109 19.60 26.80
41 Food, drink and tobacco industries 19 3.42 30.22
43 Textile industry 4 0.72 30.94
44 Leather industry 1 0.18 31.12
45 Footwear and clothing industry 9 1.62 32.73
46 Timber and wooden furniture industries 23 4.14 36.87
47 Manufacturing of paper and paper products 21 3.78 40.65
48 Processing of rubber and plastics 8 1.44 42.09
49 Other manufacturing industries 2 0.36 42.45
40-49 Other manufacturing industries 87 15.65 42.45
50 Building constructs 30 5.40 47.84
50-59 Building and civil engineering industry 30 5.40 47.84
61 Wholesale distribution 71 12.77 60.61
62 Scrap and waste materials handling 4 0.72 61.33
63 Wholesale agents 11 1.98 63.31
64 Retail distribution 13 2.34 65.65
66 Hotels and catering 6 1.08 66.73
67 Repair of consumer goods and vehicles 3 0.54 67.27
60-69 Distributive trades, hotels, caters and
repairs
108 19.43 67.27
72 Land transport 8 1.44 68.71
75 Air transport 3 0.54 69.24
76 Supporting transport services 4 0.72 69.96
77 Travel agents 3 0.54 70.50
79 Communication services 4 0.72 71.22
70-79 Transport and communication 22 3.96 71.22
81 Credit transactions institutes 15 2.70 73.92
83 Computer services 94 16.91 90.83
84 Renting and leasing activities 6 1.08 91.91
80-89 Business services 115 20.69 91.91
92 Sanitary services 3 0.54 92.45
93 Educational services 1 0.18 92.63
94 Research and Development 4 0.72 93.35
97 Recreational services 27 4.86 98.20
98 Personal services 4 0.72 98.92
99 Domestical services 6 1.08 100
90-99 Other services 45 8.10 100
TOTAL All sectors 556 100 100
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TABLE 2
Descriptives and t-statistics of Deflated Earnings Levels*
Interval Real observations Expected observations Variance Stdev. t-statistics
[-0.01, 0.00] 23.00 38.00 36.88 6.07 -2.47***PE Backed,
2 and 3 years before participation [ 0.00, 0.01] 59.00 32.50 63.46 7.97  3.33***
[-0.01, 0.00] 11.00 25.50 20.88 4.57 -3.17***PE Backed,
1 year before participation [ 0.00, 0.01] 40.00 17.50 41.66 6.45  3.49***
[-0.01, 0.00] 38.00 55.00 59.19 7.69 -2.21***Non-PE Backed,
3 to 1 year before participation [ 0.00, 0.01] 95.00 50.00 103.72 10.18  4.42***
*  Deflated earnings levels consist of profit after taxes (PAT) and are measured by deflating current year’s PAT by lagged
total assets. Interval widths are determined by the following formula: (2IQR).n-1/3, with IQR = interquartile range and n =
total number of observations. This formula optimizes the interval width, given (i) the variability of the data and (ii) the
total number of observations (Scott, 1992). The expected number of observations is the average number of the two
adjacent intervals. Variances (s²) are equal to  N . pi . (1 – pi) + ¼ . N . (pi-1 + pi+1).(1 – pi-1 – pi+1) and t-statistics are
measured as: (n° of actual observation – n° of observed observations)/s . Note: * = statistically significant at 10% level, **
= statistically significant at 5% level,  *** = statistically significant at 1% level
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TABLE 3
Descriptives and t-statistics of Deflated Earnings Changes *
Sample Interval Real observations Expected observations Variance Stdev. t-statistics
[-0.01, 0.00] 41.00 28.00 47.39 6.88 1.89***PE Backed,
2 and 3 years before  participation [ 0.00, 0.01] 31.00 27.00 39.61 6.29 0.644**
[-0.01, 0.00] 21.00 23.00 28.41 5.33 -0.38***PE Backed,
1 year before participation [ 0.00, 0.01] 32.00 20.00 65.99 6.00 2.00***
[-0.01, 0.00] 57.00 59.50 75.34 8.68 -0.29***Non-PE Backed,
3 to 1 year before participation [ 0.00, 0.01] 66.00 49.00 49.14 8.90 1.91***
*  Deflated changes in profit after taxes (?PAT) are measured by deflating the change in PAT figures (PATt – PATt-1) by
lagged total assets. Interval widths are determined by the following formula: (2IQR).n-1/3, with IQR = interquartile range
and n = total number of observations. This formula optimizes the interval width, given (i) the variability of the data and
(ii) the total number of observations (Scott, 1992). The expected number of observations is the average number of the two
adjacent intervals. Variances (s²) are equal to  N . pi . (1 – pi) + ¼ . N . (pi-1 + pi+1).(1 – pi-1 – pi+1) and t-statistics are
measured as: (n° of actual observation – n° of observed observations)/s . Note: * = statistically significant at 10% level, **
= statistically significant at 5% level,  *** = statistically significant at 1% level
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TABLE 4
Time-Series Distribution of Discretionary Accruals (Expressed as % of lagged Total
Assets) *
Year - 2 Year - 1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2
Median DCA –
PE backed 2.13% 2.96% 4.05% 2.50% 1.15%
N° of observations 166 151 138 137 127
P within (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.541)
Median DCA –
Non-PE backed 1.25% 1.01% 0.13% 0.04% -0.52%
N° of observations 160 156 146 143 133
P within (0.101) (0.106) (0.152) (0.629) (0.819)
P (between) (0.186) (0.028) (0.035) (0.031) (0.493)
*   This table contains median discretionary current accruals for both the PE backed and the non-PE backed sample. The
initial sample consisted of 556 private equity backed firms and 556 control firms, matched on (i) size,  (ii) age and (iii)
sector code in the year before the PE investment. We only included companies with available data in a time frame of 2
years before until 2 years after the participation date to evaluate the time-series discretionary accruals trend over this
period. As a result, only companies of more than 2 years old could be incorporated in this calculation. Further, a
substantial number of companies had missing data on parts of the NAV (net added value) measure. Eventually, this
resulted in 166 observations for the PE backed sample and 160 for the non-PE backed sample in (t-2). Remaining
differences in number of observations between both samples are a result of lacking data in a specific year. Current
accruals consist of the change in non-cash current assets and the change in current liabilities. Non-discretionary current
accruals (NDCAs) are current accruals by a within two-digit (respectively one-digit) NACE industry cross-sectional
modified Jones model (cfr. Teoh et al., 1998a & b: see appendix 1 for more details). DCAs are scaled by lagged total
assets and measure the direction and the average amount of earnings management at each specific observation year. P
values (within) are calculated by running a simple t-test and measure whether median DCA levels are significantly
different from zero for each observation year separately. P-values (between) come from a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank
test and measure differences between sample means.
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TABLE 5
Level of Earnings Management in all Observed Years (Heckman 2 Step Regression
Model) *
Year –2 Year –1 Year 0 Year +1 Year +2
variable coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat.
intercept  0.079 0.46*** 0.043 0.19*** 0.069 0.36*** 0.065 0.40*** -0.026 -0.16***
pe backing dummy 0.176 1.09*** 0.914 4.79*** 0.723 6.19*** 0.363 4.72*** 0.182 1.87***
ln(size) -0.007 -0.70*** -0.021 -1.46*** -0.021 -1.86*** -0.016 -1.55*** -0.006 -0.64***
ln(age) -0.029 -1.62*** -0.043 -1.74*** -0.054 -2.66*** -0.009 -0.61*** 0.035 2.21***
change in earnings 0.006 0.62*** -0.003 -0.28*** 0.005 0.47*** 0.002 0.25*** -0.005 -0.61***
leverage -0.059 -1.52*** -0.083 -1.26*** -0.012 -0.20*** -0.058 -4.57*** -0.086 -2.63***
sector dummies included - - - - - - - - - -
# of observations 326** 307** 284*** 280*** 260***
adjusted r² 4.2%** 10.0%* 18.7%* 13.6%** 6.6%***
selection equation:
probit model c² c² c² c² c²
intercept 0.051 0.24*** 0.004 0.00*** -0.126 1.14*** 0.241 3.78*** **0.102 0.83***
change in total assets 0.476 4.37*** 0.312 3.16*** 0.663 9.16*** 0.773 7.57*** 0.822 5.75***
gearing -0.001 0.23*** 0.007 0.51*** 0.001 0.00*** -0.011 1.68*** 0.013 1.35***
accumulated profit/ta -0.160 1.32*** -0.176 0.81*** -0.561 1.72*** -0.005 0.01*** -0.252 1.90***
investments/ ta 0.349 0.36*** 0.690 1.13*** 0.662 0.86*** -0.217 0.09*** -1.330 2.80***
cash available/ta -2.039 3.72*** -1.957 3.51*** -1.432 1.90*** -5.216  12.76*** -1.827 5.07***
* This table presents the results of 5 yearly regression analyses of the level of earnings management, proxied by discretionary
current accruals, on a number of firm-specific control variables:
iiiLEViIBXiageisizeiPEii INDLeverageIBXagesizePEDCA ebbbbba +Q++D++++=
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PE backing is an interaction variable taking the value of 1 if the firm received PE financing and 0 otherwise. This variable
allows to test for the differences in earnings management between PE backed and non-PE backed firms. Ln(size) and Ln(age)
are the natural logarithms of total assets and age expressed in number of in years, respectively. Change in earnings is the
year-on-year change in income before extraordinary items, deflated by lagged income before extraordinary items (DIBX).
Leverage equals (1 – BV Equity/TA), with BV Equity being the book value of equity and TA = total assets. This variable
measures the extent of leverage, i.e. a solvency measure,  of a firm. The higher a firm’s leverage, the less own resources a
firm uses to finance its business activities and/or the higher the level of outstanding debt is. We included sector dummies at a
one-digit NACE level. The coefficient are not reported for the sake of brevity. We mention that NACE sector 3 & 4 report
accruals more aggressively compared to other sectors over most of the years. The coefficients in the standard OLS regression
model are not reported for the sake of brevity. All test-statistics are White (1980) corrected for heteroscedasticity. The
Heckman 2 Step Regression model controls for endogeneity in our sample, possibly resulting from a selection bias. More
details are provided in Appendix 2. There are 5 independent variables in our first selection equation to test the hazard of
receiving PE financing. Change in total assets measures the firm’s growth and equals [(TAt)-(TAt-1]/(TAt-1). Gearing is the
level of a firm’s outstanding debt on the level of equity and controls for the firm’s solvency situation. Accumulated profit
shows a firm’s past profitability and measures the internal financing capacity of companies under investigation. Investments
measure a company’s investment intensity while cash available controls for the liquidity position of a company. Accumulated
profit, Investments and Cash Available are all deflated by total assets to avoid heteroscedasticity problems.




Descriptives of Transitory Earnings Sample (Post-Investment Only) *
Panel A:
All








Number obs. 4,202 2,952 4,202 4,202 4,202
Mean 11,811,194 102.25 –0.48 –0.51 –0.53
% > 0 100 100 68 71 70
% < 0 0 0 32 29 30
25% percentile 956,416 16.54 –1.05 –0.54 –0.75
Median 2,815,550 83.04 1.87 2.06 1.39
75% percentile 7,874,784 153.14 6.79 7.21 5.21
Panel B:
PE backed sample
Total Assets Sales /TA
(%)
CP/TA  (%) PBT/TA (%) PAT/TA (%)
Number obs. 2,062 1,555 2,062 2,062 2,062
Mean 15,482,927 92.14 –1.01 –1.08 –1.09
% > 0 100 100 67 69 68
% < 0 0 0 33 31 32
25% percentile 1,409,262 10.34 –1.47 -1.23 –1.31
Median 4,033,302 81.37 1.54 1.53 1.09
75% percentile 11,337,600 134.49 5.78 6.12 4.62
*  Note: this table presents descriptive values for total assets (TA), sales, current profit (CP), profit before taxes (PBT) and
profit after taxes (PAT) with all variables (except for total assets itself), deflated by total assets in the year of investment
and post-investment years. This sample is used for the transitory earnings regressions as in model (4) to (6). Panel A
contains values for all available observations, i.e. PE backed and non-PE backed. Panel B shows descriptives of the
subsample of PE-backed companies only.
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TABLE 7
Coefficients and Expected Signs in Interaction Regressions
Model (5): differences in earnings conservatism between  PE backed and non-PE backed companies:
15411312110 )(**)()( ----- D++DD+D+D+=D tttttt NINEGPEPENININEGNININEGNI bbbbba
tttt NININEGPENIPE ebb +DD+D+ --- 11716 *)(**
SAMPLE ACTION EXPECTED SIGN
Timely recognition of losses (b2+ b3) < 0Non-PE backed
Losses are recognized more timely than gains (b3) < 0
Timely recognition of losses (b2+ b3) + (b6+ b7) < 0PE backed
Losses are recognized more timely than gains (b3+ b7) < 0
PEB recognize losses more timely compared to non-
PEB companies (b6+ b7) < 0PE backed versus non-PE
backed PEB recognize losses more timely than gains compared
to non-PEB companies (b7) < 0
Model (6): differences in earnings conservatism between government PE backed and non-government PE backed
companies:
15411312110 )(**)()( ----- D++DD+D+D+=D tttttt NINEGGOVGOVNININEGNININEGNI bbbbba
tttt NININEGGOVNIGOV ebb +DD+D+ --- 11716 *)(**
SAMPLE ACTION EXPECTED SIGN
Timely recognition of losses (b2+ b3) < 0Non-government PE
backed Losses are recognized more timely than gains (b3) < 0
Timely recognition of losses (b2+ b3) + (b6+ b7) < 0Government PE backed
Losses are recognized more timely than gains (b3+ b7) < 0
Non-government PE backed firms recognize losses
more timely compared to government PE backed
companies
(b6+ b7) > 0
Non-government versus
government PE backed Non-government PE backed recognize losses more





Transitory Earnings Regression 1*
Model 1:
(1) Basic model (4)
(2)   Model inclusive PE indicator variables (model 5)
Variable coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
(1) Basic model Current profit/loss afterfinancial income




Intercept (b0) 0.024 0.88*** -0.256 -4.79*** -0.226 -4.22***
NEG(?NI)t- 1 (b1) -0.031 -0.74*** 0.225 2.70*** 0.163 1.99***
?NIt-1 (b2) 0.029 -0.33*** 2.541 17.00*** 2.682 17.47***










Intercept (b0) -0.001 -0.02*** 0.001 0.01*** -0.004 -0.06***
NEG(?NI)t- 1 (b1) -0.001 -0.03*** -0.014 -0.12*** -0.004 -0.03***
?NIt-1 (b2) -0.083 -0.42*** -0.120 -0.39*** -0.112 -0.31***
NEG(?NI)t-1 * ?NIt-1 (b3) -0.352 -0.78*** -0.584 -0.73*** -0.492 -0.58***
PE (b4) 0.054 0.99*** -0.361 -3.37*** -0.287 -2.66***
PE* NEG(?NI)t-1 (b5) -0.062 -0.73*** 0.330 1.99*** 0.178 1.09***
PE* ?NIt-1 (b6) 0.061 0.28*** 3.441 9.73*** 3.425 8.71***
PE* NEG(?NI)t-1 *?NIt-1     (b7) -0.262 -0.45*** -3.982 -3.93*** -4.350 -4.13***
Adjusted R² 0.20% 8.46% 8.43%
n 4202 4202 4202
*  This regression using time-series relations estimates the impact of changes in past year’s earnings changes on current
year’s earnings changes controlling for (1) previous negative earnings change and (2) receiving PE financing. DNIt-1  is
the change in earnings from the previous period, NEG(DNI)t-1 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when previous
year’s earnings are negative and VC is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the firm received PE:
15411312110 )(**)()( ----- D++DD+D+D+=D tttttt NINEGPEPENININEGNININEGNI bbbbba
tttt NININEGPENIPE ebb +DD+D+ --- 11716 *)(**
Test-statistics are White-corrected to control for heteroscedasticity and Durbin-Watson statistics suggest no
autocorrelation (DW close to 2). Variance Inflation Factors and Eigenvalues (not reported here) denote a substantial
amount of multicollinearity between some dependent variables. However, this finding does not lead to biased estimates
and hence is not harmful for the interpretation of our regression results (Blanchard, 1967; Hamilton, 1994).
    Note: ***: statistically significant at 1% confidence level, ** : statistically significant at 5% confidence level, * :
statistically significant at 10% confidence level.
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TABLE 9
Transitory Earnings Regression 2 *
Model 2:
(1)   Basic model (4)
(2)   Model inclusive government PE backing dummies (model 6)
Variable coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
(1) Basic model Current profit/loss afterfinancial income
Profit before taxes, after
extraordinary income
Profit after taxes (bottom
line results)
Intercept (b0) 0.037 0.70*** -0.063 -0.58*** -0.008 -0.08***
NEG(?NI)t- 1 (b1) -0.047 -0.56*** 0.018 0.11*** -0.108 -0.64***
?NIt-1 (b2) 0.135 2.40*** 0.820 7.28*** 0.814 7.23***









(2) Government-related PE  dummies
Intercept (b0) -0.089 -0.90*** 0.052 0.26*** 0.248 1.21***
NEG(?NI)t- 1 (b1) 0.121 0.73*** -0.134 -0.40*** -0.636 -1.91***
?NIt-1 (b2) 0.154 2.52*** 0.982 7.97*** 0.967 7.85***
NEG(?NI)t-1 * ?NIt-1 (b3) -0.319 -0.37*** -2.852 -1.93*** -3.884 -2.58***
GOV (b4) 0.180 1.52*** -0.074 -0.31*** -0.279 -1.17***
GOV* NEG(?NI)t-1 (b5) -0.237 -1.23*** 0.130 0.33*** 0.644 1.67***
GOV* ?NIt-1 (b6) -0.095 -0.61*** -1.011 -3.34*** -0.922 -7.03***
GOV* NEG(?NI)t-1 *?NIt-1      (b7) -0.619 -0.58*** 2.011 1.07*** 2.982 1.65***
Adjusted R² 0.50% 2.85% 3.07%
n 2062 2062 2062
*  This regression uses time-series estimates to study the impact of changes in past years’ earnings changes on current
years’ earnings changes and controls for (1) previous negative earnings change and (2) PE investor origin (government-
related versus independent). DNIt-1  is the change in earnings from the previous period, NEG(DNI)t-1 is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 when previous years' earnings are negative and GOV (‘Government  dummy’) is a dummy variable
taking the value 1 when the firm is backed by a government-related PE firm.
15411312110 )(**)()( ----- D++DD+D+D+=D tttttt NINEGGOVGOVNININEGNININEGNI bbbbba
tttt NININEGGOVNIGOV ebb +DD+D+ --- 11716 *)(**
Test-statistics are White-corrected to control for heteroscedasticity and Durbin-Watson statistics suggest no
autocorrelation (DW close to 2). Variance Inflation Factors and Eigenvalues (not reported here) denote a substantial
amount of multicollinearity between some dependent variables. However, this finding does not lead to biased estimates
and hence is not harmful for the interpretation of our regression results (Blanchard, 1967; Hamilton, 1994).
    Note: ***: statistically significant at 1% confidence level, ** : statistically significant at 5% confidence level, * :
statistically significant at 10% confidence level.
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FIGURE 1
Deflated Changes in Profit After Taxes for PE Backed Sample, 1 Year Before

















Earnings changes of PE backed
companies, 2 & 3 years prior to
participation
Earnings changes of PE backed
companies, 1 year prior to
participation
